Tuesday, December 1, 2009

Diminishing Warfare: IO

After discussing the aspects of human dignity, partnerships, and mobilization of the American people, the fourth leg of what I call "diminishing wafare," the strategy of attacking the conditions which spawn terrorism and terrorist organizations, is information ops (IO), which sounds much more sinister than it is...

Conducting Coordinated and Coherent Information Operations. The “instantaneous communications, transportation networks, information exchange, technology, and free-flow of capital” of globalization have allowed relatively small organizations (like Al Quaeda) to have worldwide impact. We must take these lessons to heart and turn the advantage to our side. By using the assets of globalization intelligently, particularly in the area of Information Operations (IO), in a coherent and coordinated manner we can dramatically increase the impact of even small efforts towards our overall objectives while denying or hampering our adversary’s ability to do the same. The common saying, “perception is reality,” is false. However, in today’s globalized environment where information is accessible across the globe nearly instantly through a variety of media, perception certainly trumps reality in many cases. IO must be fully integrated into our efforts towards diminishing the underlying causes and aimed at three distinct audiences: the target population, the international and regional communities, and the United States public, with an emphasis on listening first, so that our message can be framed in culturally-aware manner which maximizes its impact on its intended audience. However, our IO also must exhibit a consistency which recognizes that messages aimed at one audience will be heard by all three:

a. Local Target Population. As the NSCT states, the reason that underlying unjust conditions provide such fertile soil for terrorist organizations is not that terrorism is a legitimate or effective approach to solving the problems, but that people affected by these conditions perceive terrorism as such. Our IO efforts, therefore, must convince the local target populations both that terrorism is not a legitimate manner in which to address injustice and oppression and that the United States, its allies, and its partners are engaging these problems effectively. In operations involving the military, obviously public announcements, liaisons with local leadership, and the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) will play a large role. However, the most effective manner of communications at this level may be individual soldiers and units through their daily contacts and relationships with the populace.

b. International and Regional Communities. As partnerships in both the regional and international environments are vital to solving these sizable issues, our IO efforts must emphasize the legitimacy and efficacy of our efforts (giving leaders the political credibility to partner with us), while communicating the regional and world impact of the problems at hand and the corporate benefits of solving them (providing motivation to act). Combatant Commands play a significant role at this level of IO and must ensure that their messages are fully integrated with those of other agencies.

c. US Population. To mobilize the US public into action, our IO must educate the populace on the scope of the problems and the national interests involved in addressing them. IO must also detail available ways to “get involved,” as well as details of our efforts, challenges, and successes. The military can play a decisive part at this level through public information, constructive relationships news media, and existing IO entities (such as Combat Camera).
It is imperative that IO not stand on its own as a mere propaganda or deception plan, but be integrated into our overall efforts and based upon our desired perception of real and tangible initiatives and results.

Next, what role (if any) does the military have in this?

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