Last post, I wrote about the interesting and sometimes dangerous disconnect we have between our post-DESERT STORM mindset and our current-day threat. The tease was that we could somehow find a way to solve the dilemma of balancing security and freedom with a combination of technology and human resources.
OK, Pat. Time to put up or shut up.
First, let's look at the extremes.
Extreme 1: Protect freedom at all costs, leaving security to the good will of the passengers. Leave the doors open and hope that no wolves sneak in the pen with the sheep. The most common example of the weaknesses of this approach is the late 1960s, which combined with the turmoil of that time to make hijackings commonplace, peaking in 1969 when there were 34 hijackings between Cuba and the United States alone! This phenomenon was one of the main catalysts for the institution of metal detectors in airports, the precursor to the security gauntlet we have today.
Extreme 2: El Al. Take a flight on the Israeli Airline, and you'll be required to report three hours early. Every passenger will be interviewed individually by a trained interrogator. Your luggage will be put in a decompression chamber to simulate altitude changes and hopefully trigger any pressure-sensitive device. Your pilot will be a former IDF military pilot. You likely will sit within a few rows of an armed Israeli security agent. El Al has had one successful hijacking in its entire history. It happened forty years ago.
Though some will disagree with me, I don't think we want to be at either extreme. Clearly, we must take precautions to increase security of our air transportation system. On the other hand, trying to implement El-Al security levels nation-wide would be cost-prohibitive. El-Al flew 1.9 million passengers in 2008, less than a quarter of one percent of the total 809 million passengers flying within, to, and from the US that same year. The cost of 100% El-Al level screening for that many passengers would be unsustainable, and the loss in convenience would drive more passengers to find other options, further crippling our struggling airline industry.
On the other hand, relying purely on technology to save us time and resources isn't the right answer either. Already, rumors are circulating that even the highly-touted body-scanners wouldn't have detected Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab's exploding underwear. "Puffers" and other chemical scanners can be fooled. And it's probably only a matter of time until someone figures out how to make an exploding Twinkie or suppository that can evade all but surgical searches. How much do you think we'll need to pay someone to look for those?
The answer needs to involve both technology and people. Technology to do mass scans of travelers and luggage, and highly-trained and qualified professionals to conduct focused surveillance as well as interviews both of random samples of travelers and those matching certain profiles and behaviors. This, of course, must be combined with another mix of technology and people to detect and disrupt terrorist actions before the attackers even arrive at the terminal. I won't disparage the current cadre of TSA agents performing some of these tasks today. When you think of it, it's pretty impressive how quickly the agency stood up its operations. However, next time you travel on an airline (as I will tomorrow), take a good look at those people and tell me if they or their procedures meet this intent.
Do the agents look like this?
Or this?
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